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of the more general history of American economic and political develop, 
ment. Perhaps scholars will conclude that important shifts in the organiza-
tion of the civilian side of the national political economy have been mirrored 
by changes on the military side. But it also seems possible that historians 
might find that developments in the defense sector may have figured in 
some instances as leading indicators, or even driving forces, of broader de-
velopments. For example, historians might do more to explore how the steps 
taken toward the, privatization of the military-industrial complex in the 1950s 
and 1960s might have related to other aspects of the transformation of the 
so-called New Deal order. They might even consider whether those devel-
opments in the defense sector may have prefigured, and contributed 
to, changes in the broader political economy, including the moves toward 
deregulation and neoliberalism that are often described as flowering in 
the 1970s.43 
This essay may also serve to suggest how revisiting the past may liberate 
us to consider a wider range of viable policies in the present day. It may well 
be that even after looking harder at the longer-run history of the military-
industrial complex, policymakers will still conclude that the military should 
continue to get most of what it needs from for-profit contractors. But at least 
that policy choice would be better informed by an awareness that many in, 
telligent policymakers in the past favored different arrangements, in part 
because of their concerns about equity and the balance of power between 
p~blic and private actors. 
For today's historians of business and politics, the opportunities for 
doing important new work in this area seem substantial, in part because 
their predecessors, over the past couple of generations, have let the ground 
lie mostly fallow. A new generation of scholars, by doing more to compre-
hend the defense sector, should be able to write fuller, richer histories ofbusi-
ness and politics in America. 
Chapter 5 
Beyond the New Deal: Thomas K. McCraw 
and the Political Economy of Capitalism 
Richard R. John and Jason Scott Smith 
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they navigate a new and perilous terrain? All historians stand on the 
shoulders of giants. This essay contends thatthe Harvard historian Thomas K. 
Mccraw anticipated-'-and, if carefnlly read, can help inspire-the legion of 
historians who are turning their attention to topics that lie at the intersec-
tion of business and politics (understood broadly to include public policy, 
public administration, and the state), including those who have enlisted 
under the banner of the history of capitalism. 
This essay has four sections and a brief conclusion. 11ie first section show-
cases affinities between McCraw's oeuvre and the history of capitalism, a 
field that would not acquire a widely recognized collective identity until 2011, 
one year before McCraw's death.3 McCraw, in our view, was a historian of 
capitalism avant la lettre, a distinction that has been echoed by McCraw's 
longtime Harvard colleague Sven Beckert, a leading light in the field.4 
The second section surveys the first phase of McCraw's career, during 
which he was primarily concerned with the relationship of individuals and 
ideas. During this phase of his career, McCraw relied on an actor-oriented 
contextualism to demonstrate how a small number of business managers, 
government administrators, and lawmakers used institutional economics 
to influence public policy during the _New Deal, inventing an innovative 
array of new institutional arrangements that he called the "mixed econ-. 
omy." The third section shows how McCraw shifted from contextualizing 
institutional economics to using institutional economiCs as an explanatOry 
scheme. No longer did McCraw merely historicize theory; now he used 
theory to write history. It was in this phase of his career that McCraw pub-
lished what probably remains today his best-known book, the Pulitzer-
Prize winning Prophets ofRegulation.5 The fourth section, which is followed 
by a brief conclusion, shifts attention to what we regard as the major phase 
in McCraw's career, during which he expanded his range beyond the United 
States to compare and contrast the evolution of institutional arrangements 
in the United States with those in other parts of the world. It was during 
this phase that McCraw published what we regard as his two most enduring 
single-author books-both of which, interestingly, appeared following his 
retirement: Prophet of Innovation: Joseph Schumpeter and Creative Destruc-
tion (2007) and Founders and Finance: How Hamilton, Gallatin, and Other 
Immigrants Forged a New Economy (2012).6 Since the focus of this book is 
the twentieth century, we will focus on Prophet of Innovation. Readers in-
terested in Founders and Finance can learn more about its relationship to 
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McCraw's oeuvre in an already-published essay by one of this essay's 
coauthors.7 
Prophet of Capitalism 
Although McCraw taught business history for many years at the Harvard 
Business School) he was never only a business historian. Instead, he drew on 
several disciplinary traditions .to explore a wide array of topics that ranged 
from biography, entrepreneurship, and regulation, to public policy, innova-
tion, and economic thought. In Joseph Schumpeter's seminal Capitalism, 
Socialism, and Democracy, McCraw observed, the Austrian economist "freely 
crosses traditional boundaries of economics, history, political science, soci-
ology, philosophy, law, and business."8 Much the same could be said of 
McCraw himself. 
McCraw's death in 2012 (he was 72).deprived the rising generation of his-
torians of capitalism of an inspirational, eloquent, and influential ally. Though 
McCraw grew up in a very different world from the historians who currently 
dominate this field, he shared many of their aspirations and concerns. Like 
today's historians of capitalism, McCraw was impressed by credit creation as 
an engine of innovation; admiring toward the New Deal and its legacy; skepti-
cal of what we today call the neoliberal turn in politics and economics; hostile 
toward market fundamentalism; sympathetic to institutional economics; 
committed to locating American cultural norms and institutional forms in a 
cross-national setting; dedicated to depicting key figures in politics, business, 
and economics as fully rounded protagonists rather than one-dimensional 
stick figures; and convinced that the relationship of business and politics (or 
what McCraw preferred to call "business-government relations," or "regula-
tion") should be studied as a single, ever-evolving process. 
Historians of capitalism presuppose, as Beckert has observed, that "states 
and markets, politics and business, cannot be understood separately from 
one another."9 McCraw could not have put it any better. Beginning in the 
early 1970s, McCraw turned his attention to the relationship of business and 
politics in the American past, a theme that he would explore not only for the 
twentieth century, his own specialty, but also for the early republic. 
M:cCraw1s understanding of capitalism built not only on the social and 
cultural themes that have proven so influential for historians of capitalism 
but also, and even more directly, on the celebrated insight of Joseph 
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Schumpeter that, at its core, capitalism is a "perennial gale of creative de-
struction."10 For McCraw, as for Schumpeter, capitalism was protean, unpre-
dictable, disruptive, and surprisingly fragile. Nothing about its past was 
inevitable, and nothing about its future could be taken for granted. In all 
these ways, McCraw and Schumpeter differed profoundly from the law-
and-economics orthodoxy of the Chicago School of economics, with its 
equilibrium models and self-regulating price mechanisms. Underscoring 
this distinction, McCraw explained that Schumpeter was perhaps the "most 
insightful" of "all critics of perfect competition." This was because the "cre-
ative destruction" that Schumpeter had in mind was driven not by price 
competition but instead by innovation, or what Schumpeter called the com-
petition from the "new commodity, the new technology, the new source of 
supply, the new type of organization." By commanding a "decisive cost or 
quality advantage," this kind of highly disruptive, non-price-based competi-
tion struck "not at the margins of the profits and the outputs of the existing 
firms" but, instead «at their foundations and their very lives."11 
McCraw's understanding of capitalism became increasingly sophisti-
cated as his career evolved. In his first two books-each of which he re-
searched in graduate school, and each of which focused on the Tennessee 
Valley Authority (TVA), a vast public works project that helped define Franklin 
D. Roosevelt's New Deal-McCraw deployed an actor-oriented contextual-
ism to understand his protagonists. In his next major publication, Prophets 
of Regulation (1984), McCraw combined actor-oriented contextualism with 
the conceptual apparatus of institutional economics to chart the evolution 
of the independent regulatory commission. In the years between 1984 and 
his death in 2012, McCraw expanded his ambit still further in a series of 
publications that compared and contrasted the relationship of business and 
politics in the United States, Britain, Germany, and japan. His most impor-
tant single-author books from this period were Prophet of Innovation, a 
sweeping, evocative, and penetrating biography ofjoseph Schumpeter, and 
Founders and Finance, a perceptive and persuasive history of the origins of 
American public finance, 
McCraw never wavered in his deep admiration for Franklin D. Roose-
velt's New Deal-and, in particular, for its embrace of the "mixed economy," 
a public-private hybrid in which private corporations remained the primary 
engine of wealth creation, while public agencies assumed an unprecedented 
measure of responsibility for regulating business and labor, monitoring 
financial speculation, increasing business investment, .and promoting 
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economic prosperity. The preponderance in the 1950s and 1960s of a rapidly 
expanding middle class could best be explained not by demographic expan-
sion but instead by "government actions instituted during Roosevelt's presi-
dency" to safeguard the elderly by instituting Social Security, protect the 
jobless through unemployment insurance, establish a living minimum wage, 
manage aggregate demand through deficit spending, and strengthen the 
labor movement by mandating collective bargaining with the Wagner Act. 
On certain topics, such as the most likely locus of innovation, McCraw would 
shift his views over time. Yet he never abandoned his bedrock conviction 
that, as an engine of wealth generation, the "mixed economy" had been a 
stunning success. The United States could be faulted for many things, but not 
for its failure to expand output in ways that earlier generations would have 
found utterly astonishing.12 
In his later publications, McCraw would move beyond the New Deal in a 
dual sense. Most obviously, McCraw would shift his attention to other top-
ics. Instead of doubling down on the history of regulation, he expanded his 
range to capitalism, innovation, and the history of economic thought. Tue 
second way in which Mccraw altered his perspective was by adopting a chron-
ologically expansive understanding of the New Deal's legacy. McCraw's 
New Deal did not end in 1939 or, as it would for Columbia University histo-
rian Alan Brinkley, with Roosevelt's death in 1945. Rather, it became the 
indispensable modus vivendi for the historically unprecedented upsurge in 
economic growth that the United States would enjoy between the Second 
World War and the economic downturn ofl973.1' 
Historians of capitalism might prefer to call the "mixed economy" a "po-
litical economy" rather than an economy, and some skeptics will certainly 
raise questions about McCraw1s enthusiasm for economic growth.14 Even so, 
if American historiography is indeed taking a political-economic turn, then 
we would be well advised to reflect on the economic ideas and institutional 
arrangements that undergirded the postwar boom. And these ideas and in-
stitutions were emphatically not the free-market fundamentalism that is so 
fashionable today. On the contrary, economic growth was stimulated not 
only by the private sector, which McCraw always regarded as the single most 
powerful wealth creator, but also by governmental institutions that operated 
not only as an engine of innovation but also as an agent of liberal reform. At 
his most ambitious, McCraw probed the relationship of institutions and 
ideas, as Schumpeter had before him, on five different layers: the firm, 
markets, institutions, cultural values, and leadership.15 All in all, this was a 
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hugely ambitious agenda that, if it were to be embraced by today's historians 
of capitalism, would have the potential to complete the epochal "historio-
graphical transition" to which Bailey alluded in the passage that was quoted 
at the beginning of this essay. 
Actor-Oriented Contextualism 
It is one thing to recognize the merits of a multilayered explanatory scheme 
to explore the relationship of ideas and institutions and quite another to de-
vise a suitable method to facilitate its study. The first method McCraw hit 
upon was, like so much of his best writing, biographical. For McCraw, biog-
raphy was a means rather than an end. In particular, it provided hini. with a 
highly flexible tool to reconstruct the character and significance of the deci-
sions of identifiable historical actors. The primary unit of analysis was never 
the individual or even the group, but instead the context in which historical 
actors.lived, worked, and thought. Toward the end of an essay on the legacy 
of early twentieth-century progressivism, McCraw paused to "indulge" in 
what he termed the "ahistorical and risky enterprise" of identifying the most 
important generation of reformers in the American past. In this exer-
cise, McCraw awarded first place to the late eighteenth-century founders 
of the republic; secon<;l place to the New Dealers of the 1930s; and third place 
to the progressives. This exercise in "rankings and reputations," McCraw 
freely conceded, was nothing more than a parlor-game, since the historians' 
primary unit of analysis was neither the individual nor the group but the 
process through which individuals and groups interacted. 16 · 
McCraw's fascination with process had its origins in his graduate 
training in the 1960s at the University of Wisconsin in Madison. The Mad-
ison history department in McCraw's day was a petri dish brimming with 
new and sometimes radical ideas. A distinguished galaxy ofleft-leaning 
historians that included Merle Curti, George Masse, and William Apple-
man Williams was creatively reworking the ·half-century-old progressive 
canon of Charles Beard, Vernon Parrington, and Frederick Jackson 
Turner. Warren Susman, who had studied history at Wisconsin in the 
1950s, summed it up this way: "There are three parts of the god-head here 
at Wisconsin-the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost-Beard, Parring-
ton, and Turner."17 The persistence of the progressive tradition in a depart-
ment that was receptive to the radical currents of the 1960s would shape 
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the influential interpretative tradition known as the "Wisconsin School" 
and would help make the department-sponsored journal Studies on the 
Left (founded in 1959) what intellectual historian Peter Novick would call 
the "first, and in many ways the most important organized vehicle of the 
new historiographical left."18 
Madison exposed McCraw to both the familiar, and sometimes ossified, 
political-economic radicalism of the Pr?gressive era and the New Deal, as 
wel.l as to the emerging New Left critique of American power that had been 
energized by the Civil Rights movement and the growing furor over the Viet-
nam War. 
McCraw shared the Wisconsin School's interest in the relationship of 
busmess and politics and in 1989 would publish a thoughtful review of one 
of the foundational monographs to come out of the New Left-inspired "cor-
porate liberal" tradition.19 Yet his intellectual orientation had already been 
fixed by the time he arrived in Madison. The son of a TVA engineer, McCraw 
o~tai~ed his B.A. at the University of Mississippi, which he had funded by 
~mmng a s_cholarship from the Navy ROTC. Following his college gradua-
t10n and pnor to his arrival at Wisconsin, McCraw would serve an obliga-
tory four-year stint as a naval officer-a venture t.hat would give him 
first-hand exposure to a giant organization that he would repeatedly draw 
on m his scholarship, and that would set him apart from the vast majority of 
his graduate-school peers. 
The TVA was a signal achievement of Franklin D. Roosevelt's presidency, 
and McCraw proudly described himself as "a dyed-in-the-wool New Deal 
De t"20 M C ' d" · 
. mo era . . c raw_ s issertat1on on the TV A, a topic suggested to him by 
his TVA-engineer father, was, as he initially conceived of it, a study of indi-
. viduals and ideas. Only later, he would observe, would he come to see that 
its actual subject was the (tthe seductive power of organization.1121 
McCraw's mentors in graduate school included the intellectual historian 
Paul Conkin and the legal historian James Willard Hurst.22 McCraw's dis-
sertation advisor was Paul W. Glad, a political historian who had published 
a sympathetic biography of Populist firebrand William Jennings Bryan. Glad 
JOmed the Madison faculty in 1966, the same year McCraw began graduate 
school. McCraw obtained his Ph.D. in 1970, just four years after he had ar-
rived in Wisconsin. By the end of the following year, he would have two 
books in print. Although Glad would not exert an enduring influence on 
McCraw's career, he was, McCraw reminisced, a "wonderful adviser,. who 
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helped set McCraw on his future path by constantly pushing him to make 
"more rigorous connections between ideas and policies."23 
Two books grew out of McCraw's years at Wisconsin: Morgan vs. 
Lilienthal: The Feud Within the TVA (1970) and TVA and the Power Fight, 
1933-1939 (1971). The first was McCraw's master's thesis, which was published 
as a book after winning a prize administered by the history department of 
Loyola University in Chicago. Like many of McCraw's subsequent publica-
tions, its primary focus was biographical. In particular, it traced the bureau-
cratic infighting between TVA directors Arthur E. Morgan and David E. 
Lilienthal. Lilienthal proved to be the savvier operator, and he succeeded 
brilliantly in "identifying himself with a progressive program and portray-
ing Morgan as an ally or dupe of the utilities."24 
McCraw's dissertation, which became TVA and the Power Fight, focused 
less on the interplay of individuals and ideas than on the process by which 
ideas became transformed into public policy. Its principal protagonists were 
the empire-building Chicago utilities magnate Samuel Insull andthe progres-
sive Nebraska Senator George Norris. Each became a stand-in for "mutually 
hostile" traditions of electric power management: a "private tradition" pro-
moted by Insull, which "started it and built most of its network of generators 
and high-tension lines," and a "public tradition" defended by Norris that 
!!tried to curb private financial and political excesses, sometimes by going into 
the business itself."25 
··Among the most notable features of TVA and-the Power Fight was the 
close attention McCraw paid to contemporary issues in institutional ~co­
n6mics. Institutional eccinomics was a venerable tradition of academic in-
quiry that in the 1960s was rapidly being eclipsed by a new neoclassical 
orthodoxy that substituted abstraction, quantification, and mathematical 
theoryfor the industry-specific empiricism that the institutionalists prized. 
By imaginatively glossing 1930s accounts of public utilities, McCraw recon-
structed a forgotten debate over the allegedly "inherently monopolistic" cast 
of.electric power generation. The construction of an electric power plant en-
tailed huge fixed costs that were most easily recouped by operating at high 
volume. Electricity-in coD.trast to) say, automobiles or steel-could not be 
stored but rather "must be generated, transmitted, delivered, and consumed 
in virtually the same instant."26 To cover their costs) power companies orga-
nized themselves as holding companies, a legal instrument that, although 
prone to corruption, facilitated access to capital markets, simplified the 
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transportation of electric power, and streamlined the recruitment of techni-
cal and managerial personnel. 27 
History and Theory 
McCraw's performance in graduate school won him an assistant professor-
ship at the University of Texas at Austin, where he moved with his family 
in 1970. In other circumstances, he might have settled down to a long and 
productive career at one of the nation's premier public research universi-
ties. Within three years, however, he received an unusual opportunity: a 
one-year postdoctoral fellowship at the Harvard Business School. McCraw 
moved his family to Cambridge, Massachusetts, for his fellowship in 
1973-74. It would be, for him, a turning point in his career. McCraw's 
teaching and research impressed his business school colleagues-including, 
in particular, the senior business historian Alfred D. Chandler, )r.-and, in 
1976, McCraw was offered a two-year visiting professorship. Two years later, 
McCraw obtained tenure. He would remain at Harvard until his retire-
ment in 2006. 
McCraw found the intellectual environment at Harvard to be challenrr-o 
ing and demanding, and he rose to the occasion. Prior to his arrival in Cam-
bridge, his research had focused on a single government agency. Now at 
Harvard, he expanded his range to include the firm. McCraw's next major 
project reflected this more expansive agenda. Chandler had analyzed the 
firm's internal dynamics; McCraw set out to analyze the regulatory context 
in which the firm operated. In so doing, McCraw built on the sturdy foun-
dation of Chandler's magisterial history' of the managerial corporation, The 
Visible Hand (1977), which had appeared in print during McCraw's stint as a 
visiting assistant professor at Harvard, olle year before he received tenure in 
1978.28 
To analyze the relationship between government regulation and the firm, 
McCraw drew for the first time on the vocabulary and methods of social sci-
ence. No longer content to rely on the actor-oriented contextualism that had 
. served him so well in his first two books, he now turned his attention to 
deploying social science, rather than merely to studying it. In making this 
· theoretical turn, as in so much else, McCraw's built on Chandler as well 
as on the institutionalist tradition that he had first encountered when writ-
ing about the TVA. From Chandler McCraw drew the social scientific 
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distinction between vertical and horizontal integration, and from institu-
tional economics, the contrast between «center" and "periphery'> firms. 
The first fruits of McCraw's new project, «Regulation in America,» ap-
peared in 1975 in the Business History Review. A culmination of McCraw's 
fellowship year, this essay analyzed two "widely known but troublesome" 
concepts that haunted both academic and journalistic accounts of economic 
regulation: "public interest" and "capture."29 McCraw found both of these 
concepts unduly simplistic. The relationship of business and politics, in his 
view, was far too complex to be encapsulated in a single explanatory scheme. 30 
Building on the' literary skills he had honed as an undergraduate English 
major, he noted the startling rhetorical symbiosis between the critical evalu · 
ationof Progressive-era economic legislation popularized by the New Left 
historian Gabriel Kolko-who characterized the period's most important 
r~gU.latory laws as a «triumph for conservatism'1 engineered by big business 
16bbyists terrified of competition-and the highly disparaging assessment of 
federal regulatory policy proffered by the Chicago School economist George 
Stigler. For both Kolko and Stigler, the government had been "captured" by 
the interests it was ostensibly regulating-and the "public interest" was no-
where to be found. Kolko's embrace of the "capture" thesis was unequivocal. 
".Federal economic regulation," Kolko concluded in his Triumph of Conser~ 
vatism (1963), a revisionist history of progressivism from which McCraw 
quoted in his review essay-was "generally designed by the regulated interest 
to' meet its own end, and not those of the public or the..co1nmonweal.1' 31 
Stigler was no friend of the New Left. Even so, his assessment of the In-
terstate Commerce Commission (ICC) bore a remarkable similarity to argu -
ments that Kolko had advanced in Triumph of Conservatism. Inspired by 
what McCraw sardonically termed Stigler's "near-worship of the market as 
allocator of resources," the Chicago School economist had added a "measure 
ofideology" to the "cold logic of price theory." And in particular, McCraw 
faulted Stigler for transforming his burning resentment at the "interfer-
ence".oflawmakers with market forces into a full-blown market fundamen-
,talism that-surprisingly enough, given their markedly different political 
orientations-had refashioned the "Kolko model" to fit his ideological 
agenda.32 Stigler vented his wrath on ICC administrative rulings-rather 
than, like Kolko, on the political maneuvering that had culminated in regu-
latory legislation. Yet the "capture" that Stigler lamented found its consum-
mate expression not in anything the ICC did, but, rather, in the ('prior 
political power" that had called forth its original establishment as a "regula-
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tory mechanism."" Stigler, as McCraw would acerbically note several years 
later in a review of a collection of Stigler' s essays on economic regulation, had 
ventured sweeping claims about the origins and operations of early twentieth-
century regulatory commissions without consulting either historians or the 
"available evidence" and had theorized about their politics while "ignoring 
political scientists": "And why? Because for him, price theory is sufficient 
unto all things. It is not just another tool, but the philosopher's stone, The 
Answer. It is a religion, and he is a true believer."34 
The most impressive feature ofMcCraw's 1975 essay is to be found not in 
the perceptiveness with which he glossed the large and sprawling academic 
literature on regulation-though this is, by itself, a major achievement-
but, rather, in its method.35 For the first time, McCraw moved beyond the 
actor-oriented contextualism of his two books on the TVA to deploy, rather 
than merely to describe, the explanatory scheme of institutional econom-
ics. The country's principal independent regulatory commissions, McCraw 
observed-including, in particular, the ICC and the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC)-had embarked on a multifunctional project of 
diverse and sometimes even contradictory economic, political, and cultural 
agendas. 
Historians, and here McCraw included himself, had painstakingly 
chronicled these agendas by recovering the protagonists' own language. It 
was time to do more. To fully contextualize the regulatory process, histori-
ans had to transcend the actors' own conceptual categories and investigate 
the structure, conduct, and performance of the industries that the regula-
tory commissions had been established to regulate. "If, as seems likely" -
McCraw cagily observed, in venturing an educated guess that would soon 
transmogrify into an article of faith-"the inherent nature of an industry is 
the most important single context in which regulators must operate, then 
the range of policies open to them has been narrower than many observers 
have hitherto believed."36 Mc Craw framed his industry-centrism as a hypo th -
esis; it would quickly become a cri de coeur. By positing that the "inherent 
nature'' of an industry was the "most important" context for regulatory de-
cisionmaking, he presumed that industries did in fact have an inherent 
structure that rendered them impervious to political fiat in some funda-
mental, though ill-defined, way-a presumption that would shape every-
thing he wrote about business and go;,ernment for the next twenty years. 
McCraw's creative juxtaposition of history and theory informed a two-day 
interdisciplinary conference on the history of regulation that he organized 
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in 1980.37 The attendees discussed precirculated essays by four historians 
(McCraw, Morton Keller, Ellis Hawley, and Samuel P. Hays) and one politi-
cal scientist (David Vogel), all of which would be collected shortly thereafter 
by Mccraw in Regulation in Perspective (1981). 
Among the most wide-ranging and provocative of the essays to come out 
of this conference was McCraw's own "Rethinking the Trust Question."38 In 
its ambitiously titled opening section-"Elements of a Fresh Analysis" -
· McCraw borrowed from institutional economics to better understand the 
operational challenge that overcapacity posed for the large-scale industrial 
firms that had once been called "trusts" and that were now popularly known 
as "big business." Certain reformers, McCraw contended, had conspicuously 
failed to understand this operational challenge; with disastrous results. His-
•torians .should do better. In particular, they should gird themselves against 
,the profoundly mistaken "central assumption" that had been endorsed by so 
· · xrp.anybig-business critics: namely, that the trusts were "unnatural," the "bas-
1:·:\·:· ~:'.;:;" [·~¥¥.4:·o·ff~prin:g of unscrupulous promoters."39 
[ · :'.'. ';i[i;;•Among the critics that McCraw had in mind was Louis Brandeis. Hailed 
If~.):, ,.~;~.; :;;t~.i::~~.e,,. .. '..'.p~eople~s:lawyer," Brandeis had represented several defendants in an-·~.:;·:4D: ::,:j~~~:u:st~:layv-suits before he obtained a seat on the U.S. Supreme Court. Yet in 
i.··.·•.f.•.·.•.·.l.•' .. • ·.·.········. -'~!~:assault on; economic consolidation, or what he was wont to call "bigness," 
i . ..· '•'Brandeis had;· or so McCraw contended, conspicuously failed to comprehend 
' .,., .... ., ~"enthe.most rudimentary facts about the nature of the firm. 
: • ' ,; To make his point, McCraw analyzed a set of unpublished lectures that 
· Brandeis had prepared in the 1890s for a course on business law that he taught 
atthe Massachusetts Institute of Technology. These lectures, in McCraw's 
view, provided a key to Brandeis's jurisprudence as both an advocate and a 
jurist . .In his explication of the law, McCraw observed, Brandeis had 
displayed an inability to "grasp the distinction" between vertical and horizon-
tal integration and between center and periphery firms. As a consequence, 
Brandeis was fundamentally confused about how and why big businesses 
evolved, which business practices "would or would not help consumers," and 
which types of organizations "were or were not efficient."40 
Perhaps the most startling feature of Brandeis's lectures was the sur-
prising cast of characters for whom he served as a "mouthpiece." They were, 
most emphatically not "the people"-Brandeis's earnest protestations to 
the contrary-but instead a motley group of retail druggists, small shoe 
manufacturers, and other members of the "petite bourgeoisie."41 By failing 
.to locate the "inherent nature" of the industries in w)iich they operated, 
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Brandeis had demonstrated one of the "characteristic shortcomings of the 
American regulatory tradition"; namely, a "powerful disinclination" to per-
sist in hard economic analysis that might "lead away from strong ideologi-
cal preference."12 
McCraw's indictment of Brandeis's economic literacy would eventually 
occasion.a vigorous rebuttal from McCraw's former student Gerald Berk. 
McCraw, in Berk's view, had exaggerated Brandeis's nalvete and ignored his 
political critique of the potentially deleterious consequences of concentrated 
economic power.43 Even so, McCraw's indictment quickly gained adherents, 
at least in part because it echoed, and very possibly drew inspiration from, the 
markedly similar critique of the progressives as backward-looking, econom-
ically naive denizens of a status-anxious middle class that the political histo-
rian Richard Hofstadter had famously mounted several decades earlier in 
his Age of Reforrn.44 Further support for McCraw's position came from one of 
McCraw's graduate school mentors, Willard Hurst. Hurst, as it happens, 
had once served as a law clerk for Brandeis, and when queried by McCraw . 
about Brandeis's economic literacy, proved to be "enormously helpful" in re-
assuring him that "I was right in my heretical interpretation of Brandeis's 
thinking about economic matters."45 
The theoretical position McCraw staked out in his "Trust Question" 
would inform much of what he would write in the next few years on the 
independent regulatory commission. The "great achievement" of the SEC 
during the Great Depression, McCraw concluded, in a thoughtful analysis 
of its early years that he published in 1982, "was to restore legitimacy to an 
essential element of the capitalist framework."46 The key to this achievement 
lay in the process SEC regulators hit upon to restore public confidence in 
the nation's capital markets. By recruiting brokers, bankers, accountants, 
and lawyers to police corruption, the agency mobilized the talents of inter-
ested parties, a strategy that the economist Charles Schultze would famously 
term the "public use of private interest."47 · 
Gifted regulators sometimes changed their minds. A case in point was 
SEC chairman James M. Landis. Though Landis had relied on institutional 
economics to defend commission regulation in his 1938 book, The Ad-
ministrative Process, he would later undertake a ((merciless dissection of 
regulatory failure" in a 1960 report for the incoming John F. Kennedy ad-
ministration.48 The evolution of Landis's thinking, McCraw concluded, 
paralleled the wider arc of American liberalism from the New Deal to the 
Great Society.49 
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McCraw's research on the regulatory commission culminated with the 
1984 publication of Prophets of Regulation: Charles Francis Adams, Louis D. 
Brandeis, James M. Landis, and Alfred E. Kahn.50 Here, as in his essay on the 
SEC and his books on the TVA, McCraw relied on biography to carry his 
narrative. To a greater extent than had been possible in his first two books, 
McCraw located his dramatis personae in a theoretically informed explana-
tory scheme. "This book is about people," McCraw would later explain, '·'but 
more importantly it's about the strategy of regulatory agencies."51 McCraw's 
goal as. author, as he would later elaborate, was to place a "very intelligent 
person 'inside a regulatory agency," confront that person with a ((series of 
problems that demanded innovative polices," and "see what outcomes fol-
lowedi'52 To reconstruct such a complex· sequence of events demanded far 
more than a fluid expository style. In addition, it presupposed a robust theo-
'reticaHramework that McCraw gleaned from Chandlerian business history 
· .-.:-- ·::: 3.1id~institutional economics. 
' ->Although Prophets of Regulation was widely regarded as an intellectual 
<:·pistory, McCraw took care to emphasize the interplay of ideas and institu-
\'.1ti~D,~: ''.Despite the power of thought in the history of regulation, ideas in 
'








d not de1ter~in1 e concre:e ohutdcot~es."5~hFdromth the vanta~et .'-: . ;;ppint:o_.·t e. s, neoc ass1ca economics a r1ump e : e econom1s 
f1 c;.Vi)(Ajfred E:.Kahn) supplanting not only the lawyer (James M. Landis) but '!lso 
\, ;<'the'jurist (Louis D. Brandeis) and the advocate (Charles Francis Adams). Yet 
· the future remained open. "What I have called in this book the 'economist's 
h.our' of the 1970s and 1980s," McCraw cautioned, "represents a phenome-
. 1loffofunpredictable duration."54 
:: . · Tue'thinly veiled skepticism with which McCraw regarded the "econo-
miSt's hour"-the vindication, as it were, of the law-and-economics ortho-
doxy about which he had long harbored such misgivings-was balanced by 
his unabashed confidence in his method. What had remained in 1975 a 
promising hypothesis about the "inherent nature" of the firm had now ac-
quired the status of an iron law of social science: "Every industry, whether 
'.regulated or not, does possess a certain underlying economic structure: 
characteristics that mal<e it different from other industries and that help to 
shape the internal conditions for regulatory opportunities and constraints. 
More than any other single factor, this underlying structure of the particular 
industry being regulated has defined the context in which regulatory agencies 
have operated."55 
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Prophets of Regulation was well received both inside the academy and 
among the general public. In addition to garnering the 1985 Pulitzer Prize 
for hi:Story, it received the Business History Review's triennial Thomas New-
comen award for the best book in business history. Sympathetic reviewers 
played down its industry-centric essentialism and focused on its mastery of 
biographical detail. "By centering his analysis around biography," observed 
Barry Karl in the Business History Review, "McCraw might be making "his 
most important historical assertion," yet he had done it "so subliminally that 
its significance could get lost": "Economic and political ideas, he implies, are 
neither pure abstractions nor fixed realities. They are conceptions held by 
men who seek to give them effect in the world they see in front of them."56 . 
More skeptical was the economic historian Gavin Wright. Writing in 
Reviews in American History, Wright raised penetrating questions about 
McCraw's essentialism while praising Prophets of Regulation as a "landmark" 
in the "modern resuscitation of 'the market' to intellectual and political 
respectability" -a backhanded compliment, given McCraw's misgivings 
about neoclassical economics.57 The hard-and-fast distinction that McGraw 
made between center and periphery firms, Wright observed, was "not 
matched by a rigorous body of research documenting the economic basis for 
survival-power on the part of large, vertically-integrated corporations." 
As a case in point, Wright cited an innovative monograph on the great 
merger movement (by Naomi Lamoreaux, then a recently minted Johns 
Hopkins PhD) that had pointedly questioned the economic rationale for 
late nineteenth-century economic consolidation.58 Even McCraw had con-
ceded, Wright elaborated, that the center-periphery duality would become 
"somewhat less useful" as a conceptual tool after the Second World War, given 
corporate diversification, the rise of the conglomerate, and the growing allure 
of franchising. 59 Each of these developments revealed the contingent character 
of the supposedly "natural" technological imperatives that McCraw, following 
Chander, had so admired: "Since the corporate structure of modern business 
enterprise only stabilized in the 1920s, and began to escape its bounds in these 
ways in the 1960s, this means that the window in historical time during 
which these alleged deep technological imperatives were at work was in fact 
rather brief."60 
Wright's critique highlighted a limitation of McCraw's method that, 
by the end of his career, even sympathetic students of McCraw would con-
cede. From the standpoint of hindsight, and notwithstanding its enviable 
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renown, Prophets of Regulation remains an artifact of a post-New Deal 
debate in institutional economics over the intellectual merits of the 
technologically driven explanatory scheme that lay at the heart of Chan-
dlerian business history. 
The United States and the World 
Looking back on Prophets of Regulation, McCraw reflected that he had taken 
inspiration not only from Chandler but also from the interdisciplinary hot-
house of the Harvard Business School.61 This school had a marked influence 
not only on McCraw's scholarship but also on his teaching. Unlike most his-
tory professors, McCraw's primary classroom audience consisted neither of 
impressionable undergraduates nor would-be history professors. Rather, 
they were ambitious and assertive MBA students, of whom roughly one-
third hailed from outside the United States. In keeping with the Harvard 
Business School tradition, McCraw abandoned formal lectures (a pedagogi-
cal style at which he had excelled at Texas) in favor of the Socratic question-
and-answer "case method." It was not always easy. On more than one 
occasion, McCraw repeated the observation of his predecessor N. S. B. 
Gras-the first professor to hold the chair in business history that McCraw 
inherited following Chander's retirement-that it could be an "exceedingly 
difficult task" to persuade MBA students of the relevance of history in the 
months just before they embarked on careers in-'..'practical affairs": "I am not 
sure that I will succeed, but I do sympathize with the motive behind the ex-
periment, that is, to give the students a cultural background for their work 
and a perspective to their training."62 
The challenges of teaching such a. diverse and demanding group of stu-
dents helped prod McCraw to expand his intellectual horizons beyond the 
United States. Cross-national comparisons were an integral component of a 
required :first-year MBA course on business, government, and the interna-
tional economy that McCraw taught for many years. These comparisons fur-
nished the rationale for an -innovative second-year elective course on "the 
coming of managerial capitalism" that McCraw helped design. By focusing 
on what McCraw termed "the relentlessness of change" in myriad realms-
including managerial prerogatives; firm and industry structure, technology, 
and the external environment-McCraw's courses surveyed the evolution of 
economic institutions in four countries-the United States, Great Britain, 
Germany, and Japan.63 
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The internationalization ofMcCraw's outlook on the relationship of busi-
ness and politics received a boost from Chandler's own example. I~ the late 
1970s, Chandler began research on a cross-national history of industrial 
capitalism in the United States, Great Britain, and Germany. Following 
Chandler's lead, McCraw published in 1984 a cross-national essay that com-
pared the sequencing of the rise of big government and big business in the 
United States, Europe, and japan-" Only in the United States, McCraw con-
cluded, had big business emerged before big government, a circumstance that he 
believed went far toward explaining the persistence of what he called-following 
Chandler, who had floated a similar argument several years earlier-the uniquely 
"adversarial" relationship between government and business in the post-1880 
United States. 
The cross-national contrast that McCraw found most intriguing involved 
the United States and Japan. In the United States, McCraw hypothesized, the 
relationship between business and politics was far more conflict-ridden than 
in Japan, a distinction that helped explain the rapid rise of Japan as an in-
dustrial power. To find out what Americans might learn from the Japanese, 
McCraw spent a few weeks in Japan for several summers in the 1980s, gain-
ing insights into Japanese business history that he would draw on in an am-
bitious cross-national research project on the relationship between business 
and politics in the United States and Japan. This project culminated in 
the publication of a multiauthor collection of essays titled Americ.a versus 
Japan that compared and contrasted the relationship of business and pol-
itics in the United States and Japan, to the decided advantage of the lat-
ter.65 The adversarial nature of the relationship between business and 
politics in the United States-and, in particular, the constant threat of 
antitrust prosecution-made the United States a much less business-
friendly place. In Japan, in contrast, a benign and paternalistic Ministry 
of International Trade and 'Industry promoted harmony and economic 
growth by matching production to demand while fostering technological 
innovation. 
American versus Japan was McCraw's least successful scholarly project. 
Few ofits contributors were East Asianists, and none had conducted extensive 
primary research in Japanese-language primary sources. Even so, it provided 
McCraw with a glimpse of the possibilities of cross-national institutional 
comparisons. "As the great historian Macaulay once wrote," McCraw ob-
served in a summary essay, '"He knows not England who only England 
knows'; and our experience in writing the book has confirmed the wisdom 
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of Macaulay's comment."66 The "basic point is well made," as one nofentirely 
sympathetic East Asianist observed, in a review of the collection: there was 
"not simply one form of competition, one best way to organize, one effective 
way to manage .... Instead, every economy is really a political economy and 
the structures that emerge in the course of history and of political and 
economic maneuver lead to differences in national and corporate strategy, 
policy, and action."67 
Decidedly more successful was McCraw's next major venture in cross-
national comparative history, a multiauthor textbook-designed for the 
business school market, and for many years required reading for first-year 
MBA students at Harvard Business School-that analyzed the evolution of 
economic institutions in both the private and public sectors in the United 
States, Great Britain, Germany, and Japan.68 Titled Creating Modern Capi-
talism: How Entrepreneurs, Companies, and Countries Triumphed in Three 
Industrial Revolutions, edited by McGraw and published by Harvard Univer-
sity Press in 1997, this surprisingly coherent and eminently readable over-
view included sparkling essays on all four countries. by leading specialists 
in their fields that were complemented by highly informative synthetic 
chapters by McGraw. Almost twenty years after its publication, it remains 
one of the best, if not the best, single-volume institutionally oriented his" 
tories of capitalism in print. 
Creating Modern Capitalism's largest theoretical debt was to Schum- · 
peter, who remained almost a half century after this death (or so McGraw 
proclaimed in his introduction), "one of the most astute of all analysts of 
capitalism."69 From a Schumpeterian perspective, McGraw reflected, any 
"worthwhile analysis" of economic phenomena had to contain "elements of 
history, theory, and statistics." The contributors to Creating Modern Capi-
talism took Schumpeter's advice.70 So too would McGraw himself in his 
hugely successful U.S. business history textbook, American Business since 
1920: How It Worked, which he published three years later.71 
McGraw would not publish his biography of Schumpeter until 2007. Yet 
he had had the economist on his radar ever since he had first arrived at Har-
vard in 1973. Schumpeter's presence loomed large at Harvard, where he had 
taught from 1932 until his death in 1950. Though Schumpeter's primary ap-
pointment was in economics, he would furnish the i.nspiration for a short-
lived Center for the Study of Entrepreneurship, funded by the Rockefeller 
Foundation, that would help advance the careers of a highly distinguished 
cohort of specialists in economic history. The center's fellows, McGraw later 
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quipped, were a veritable "Who's Who of economic historians from the 1950s 
to the 1980s." Among them were Chandler, Hugh Aitken, Bernard Bailyn, 
David Landes, Douglass North, and Henry Rosovsky-" 
McGraw's first major publication on Schumpeter dates from 1991. It took 
the form of a capsule summary of Schumpeter's life and work, intended for 
a general audience, that McGraw had been commissioned to write for a semi-
popular magazine, The American Scholar.73 In it, McGraw affirmed what 
would become known as the "Schum peter hypothesis" -that is, the pre-
sumption that the most fundamental economic innovations originated not 
in the dingy garret of a mad-genius inventor-or, to update the metaphor, in 
the Silicon Valley garage of a teenaged boy-wonder-but in a well-established 
institution such as Bell Labs or General Electric.7'1 
Giant organizations, of course, could sometimes become sclerotic, and it 
was entirely conceivable for innovation to originate on the periphery rather 
than at the center. In 1991, however, these were possibilities that McGraw did 
not see fit to entertain. McGraw had a longstanding fascination with giant 
organizations of all kinds-from Alfred Sloan's General Motors and David 
Lilienthal's TVA to James Landis's SEC-and simply assumed that sites like 
these had spawned the most fundamental innovations of the age. McGraw's 
bigger-is-better bias derived partly from his personal familiarity with the 
TV A and the Navy; partly from his deep skepticism toward the market' fun-
damentalism that by 1991 had become firmly entrenched in the economics 
profession; and partly from his embrace of certain theoretical insights de-
rived from Chandlerian business history-including, in particular, its valo-
rization of«organizational capabilities" and «economies of scope.'' 
McCraw's bigger-is-better bias received further validation from his read-
ing ofSchumpeter. The "creative destruction" wrought by innovations origi-
nating inside giant organizations, McCraw believed, was one of the main 
themes of Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. Mc Craw elaborated on this 
characterization in his 1991 essay, in which Schumpeter b~came a crypto_-
New Dealer, who combined a pragmatic understanding of institutional eco-
nomics with a Chandlerian faith in the power of organizational capabilities 
to spawn technological innovation.75 It was a remarkable interpretation, not 
the least because of the extent to which McCraw would back off from its im-
plications when he came to write his Schumpeter biography. 
Mc Craw's interpretation of Schumpeter sparked a pointed rebuttal from 
Louis Galambos, a history professor closely associated with Chandler who 
had assumed Chandler's teaching responsibilities at Johns Hopkins when 
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Chandler moved to Harvard. The occasion for Galambos's rejoinder was a 
wide-ranging U.S. Federal Trade Commission-sponsored seminar on the 
history of antitrust that McGraw had helped organize in 1981. In one of the 
most revealing moments in this seminar, Galambos conceded that, at pres-
ent, there existed a consensus among historians of innovation (and here 
Galambos lumped together McGraw and Chandler) that linked an organi-
zation's size with its capacity for innovation. To make his point, Galambos 
proposed a thought experiment. If Schumpeter were alive, Galambos hy-
pothesized, who would he pick as the more disruptive innovator: the maver-
ick General Motors president Billy Durant or Durant's successor, the 
organizational genius Alfred Sloan? Most of his colleagues, Galambos pre-
dicted, would pick Sloan over Durant. Galambos demurred. In his ·view, 
Schumpeter would pick Durant over Sloan, since, as a believer in the power 
of"creative destruction," he favored disruption over stability and chaos over 
.calm.76 
Galambos's reading of Schumpeter would eventually gain widespread trac-
tion in the .academy, and, beginning with Creating Modern Capitalism, would 
be endorsed even by McGraw. Among Schumpeter's intellectual gifts, McGraw 
wrote in his introduction, was his encouragement of a ((dynamic, flexible, and 
future-oriented way of thinking" that "injected a pattern of ceaseless and mer-
ciless competition into nearly every aspect oflife."77 Not until the publication 
of Prophet of Innovation, however, would McGraw fully back off from the im-
plications of the bigger-is-better argument that he-l.:1ad advanced in 1991. 
Prophet of Innovation was in many ways McGraw's most impressive book. 
Beautifully written, well researched, and consistently illuminating about 
matters large and small, it offers its readers a superb introduction to an econ-
omist whom McGraw and many others have come to hail as the world's pre-
eminent theorist of capitalism. In its opening chapters, McGraw dutifully 
recounted the economist's Austrian upbringing and German education. Yet 
it was not until Schumpeter relocated in midcareer across the Atlantic to take 
a professorship at Harvard that McGraw really hit his stride. For it was at 
Harvard that Schumpeter would nurture a generation of economists who 
would rise to the front ranks of their profession after the Second World 
War, while writing three of his most impressive books-Business Cycles 
(1939), Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (1942), and the posthumously 
published History of Economic Analysis (1954). The second and third of these 
books-Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy and The History of Economic 
Analysis-were haik:d from the moment of their publication as masterpieces; 
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· the first, Business Cycles, made reviewers' heads spin. Sprawling, pretentious, 
and overlong, it discouraged even sympathetic readers-which was highly 
unfortunate, in McCraw's opinion, since it included enough trenchant 
insights into business behavior to make it a foundational history of capital-
ism in the United States if only a creative editor had reorganized it to make 
its central argument more compelling.78 
The Schumpeter of McCraw's Prophet of Innovation was no longer the 
proto-New Dealer of his 1991American Scholar essay. Yet he was also not the 
Roosevelt-phobic anti-New Deal covert Nazi sympathizer that McCraw 
might have made him out to be had he been so inclined.79 More impor-
tantly, McCraw's 2007 Schumpeter had become, rather like McCraw him-
self, much more sympathetic than McGraw's 1991 Schumpeter had been 
toward the innovative potential of insurgent start-up firms and adversar-
ial regulatory regimes. The "Schumpeter hypothesis" linking bigness and 
innovation had ceased to be an article of faith among historians and social 
scientists, and McCraw embraced the new consensus. "Innovation,'' McCraw 
now conceded, in a revealing footnote, was simply "not as automatic in large 
enterprises as Schumpeter makes it out to be in Capitalism, Socialism, and 
Democracy."80 Had McCraw lived, he might well have published yet another 
masterwork. Following the publication of Founders and Finance, McCraw 
embarked on a new research project on the history of immigrant entrepre-
neurship that built on his newfound appreciation for the innovative potential 
of individuals who worked not at the center but on the periphery. 81 
Conclusion 
McGraw's major publications in twentieth-century U.S. history-TVA and 
the Power Fight, Prophets of Regulation, and Prophet of Innovation-offer up 
a heady mix of insights for historians interested' in the relationship of busi-
ness and politics in the American past. When McCraw began to publish on 
what historians today call "political economy" (a term McCraw rarely used), 
institutional history remained marginalized in the historical profession. 82 To 
hasten its revival, he combined an actor-oriented contextualism with. theo-
retical insights drawn from Chandlerian business history and institutional 
economics to craft compelling analytical narratives about key developments 
in the making of the modern world. 
The defining events that shaped McCraw's historical imagination were the 
Great Depression, the New Deal; the Second World War, and the postwar 
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economic boom. Unlike today's historians of capitalism, McCraw remem-
bered how business and politics had interacted in the period preceding the 
post-1973 economic downturn, the dot-com bubble of 2000, and the Great 
Recession of 2008. This reservoir of personal knowledge gave McCraw a 
sense of optimism about creative statecraft that is often missing today. 
At the heart ofMcCraw's achievement lay an enviable gift for combining 
lucid prose and theoretical rigor to explore the character and significance of 
five different kinds of phenomena: business, markets, institutions, cultu~e, 
and leadership. He was, in short, an exemplary historian of capitalism who 
helped lay the foundations for a field that would take as its primary subject a 
nexus of relationships that, as one of its most penetrating practitioners has 
observed, are perhaps best characterized not as capitalism but as political 
econoi:riY· 83 
To understand the relationship between business and politics in the 
twentieth century-or what McCraw would call at different times the "mixed 
economy" or "mode.rn capitalism" -historians would do well not to forget 
the legacy of the New Deal, a legacy that extended well beyond the 1930s and 
would lay the foundation for the unprecedented prosperity that the Ameri-
can people would enjoy in the postwar era. To understood how this all came 
about, it is incumbent on the historian to look not only to contingency, 
luck, and the momentous transformations wrought by the Second World 
War, but also to statesmen, business leaders, and social scientists.84 TO be 
sure, McCraw's faith in the collective wisdom oflawmakers would be sorely 
challenged by the regulatory failures that contributed to the 2008 financial 
crisis. Yet McCraw remained to the end, as he had been throughout his 
career, a principled champion of liberal reform and a pointed critic of the 
market fundamentalism that he feared would imperil not only the economic 
foundations of capitalism, but also the humanistic, theoretically informed, 
and morally grounded exploration of modernity that McCraw's scholarship 
exemplified, and that remains a resource, a challenge, and an inspiration for 
historians today.85 
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